AUG 2 7 2014

of the State of Washington

Ronald R. Carpenter Clerk

David W. Creveling
Defendent / Appellant
V.

Armendariz etal

Intervenors/Respondents

Appellants (Icrification on the facts
frankleit, put before the work by Mr Homillon
in Respondent's upposition to Appellant's Petition
for Discretioning Review dated August 19, 2014
-RPPLY to Answer-

David W. Creveling 110 Gold Crock Lp Rd Con How Wa 98814 (509) 923-2003 The weal should great my petition as previously presented.

The bound should take sactionis against Mr. Hunithow and the title insurance lumpon the represents. that issued title insurance to the

Respondants.

# Facts misrepresented by Homitton

I am only gring to advers the impurhont facts.

1) Jenniter soil the property subject to the law soil to liandow LLC which soil the property to the respondents

The respondents book the property susject to the law soit and never intervened into the law soit.

After the default judgement was granted the respondents had no legal interest in the property.

The respondents had therefore no legal right to intervene.

2) I objected to the intervenous and there coursed and only was agreeable for July (up to how my motions on June 6, 2012

Attached is the Transcript from large £ 03-2-00182-3 that shows my objection.

3) The 04-2-00014-1 case was only for the payoff amount on the Sellers interest that had been foss and Edna Geneling's seller, interest transfelred to Dewade Creveling and Carol Coffey then transfermed to me your laterather the 03-2-00182-3 lawsund on the purchasers interest bought direct from Foss and Edner Creveling in 1989.

Athotohed is the transcript from the 04-2-00014-1 case for August 31, 2005 and January 9, 2006 that maker clear that the payoff on the Seller interest had no relevence to the 03-2-00182-3 CARE involving the buyer interest that I was seeking returned to me that Jenniter had gotten through fraud from me in the divorce.

4) I addressed gothe clearly to the went that for this case before the Suprome Count in Suprome bunt # 90420-1 ther I had inquired with westlaw and westlaw had done 2 Searches for me and found he case Ion on intervenors intervening when they had no legal interest in the property.
which satisfys RAP 13.4 (6) brought up by

Hamilton it you look at number of concer the Substantial public interest as all property transfers would then be subject to interventions by someone who had no legal interest unless the Court finds in my fororion this point.

5) Homelton also brinss up Crereling V. Stoker Supreme Court case # 890897.

The Lourhs finding that I did not can the property in gration has now brought a \$500,000 claim against okanyon Couly for Constructive fraud or inthe albernative fraud in the factum. I

The County through The deeds and nations of The employees less me to be lieue I demed burernment

The Country still Culterts takes from me on buvernment Luts 3 contrary to the washington State Supreme Counts decision # 30996-1-III

### Discussion

It is guite plain I have a right to be in'

the washington state Supreme Court under RAP 13. 4(5)(4)

or in the alternative the bount will set a new

precedent allowing people with no interest in

a property to intervene in a low soil under

talk claims of ownership.

I There was actually a hearing ofter the Supreme hand decision and Judge Colp relactly 50.00 from the bench that he now wished he had ruled differently in the Case.

and thus had no logal right to intervous. then they had no legal interest in the property intervenuel any time before the default suggement but after the default judgement was signail Frankly stated had the respondents I objected to Homilton being and their intervention would have been logal,

before Judge hip and I only agreed to my multimes being heard in bound before Judge City. to this document and set out as it tully For Course number 03-2-00182-3 is attentional The transcript for the a June 6, 2012 heaving the objection was much and the request of enj meting to be head.

attend town note from the hearings in August 31, 2005 and January 9, 2006 For Okaneya bunty land to 9-2-00014-1 to show that with laws the seller interest in the property 03-2-00:82-3 for the Total of the buyer which was myself then trumbered to dennity by fraud. Also set out as part of this dicument is the

## Con clusion

all that I asked for in my anginal petition should be granted, to do otherwise is to set precedence for people who have no legal interest in a property to be able to intervene into a lausist with no regulars to any work ordered refault subgenest.

or in the alternative

Grant what the opposition wants and you rember but decisions open to all to intervene at any date after the sidsement is rendered which basically does any with ony rend need for the sidicing.

Dated this August 24, 2014

110 bold Creek 40 Ped Certhow wa 98 814, (504) 923-2003

Certificate a) mailing

a come of this document mailed to:

Herry IC. Hometon

Fidelity National Law Group

1200 - CH Avenue, Sinte 1900

Seattle wa 98101

and Jenter Creveling

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Varyan wa 98394

2 Homiltons argument on RAP. 14 (e)(1) Is must as the intervenus had no property right after the default julgement to over lesally intervene un.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 8 IN AND FOR OKANOGAN COUNTY HOLMES, et. al., 9 Plaintiffs, No. 04-2-00014-1 10 vs. 11 CREVELING, et. al., 12 Defendants. 13 THE HONORABLE T. W. SMALL 14 August 31, 2005 (Pages 1 - 13) 15 APPEARANCES: 16 FOR THE PLAINTIFF GEBBERS: RANDY THIES 17 18 FOR THE DEFENDANT CREVELING: Pro Se 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

> Jo L. Jackson, Transcriptionist P. O. Box 914 Waterville, WA 98858 509-754-9507/509-630-1705



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Okay, let's see here.

THE COURT: Good morning.

Okay. I think we're taking up the Jennifer

Holmes v. Dewade Creveling matter, is that right?

MR. CREVELING: Yes.

THE COURT: And you're Mr. Creveling?

MR. CREVELING: I'm David Creveling.

THE COURT: You're David? You're the ex of Ms.

Holmes?

MR. CREVELING: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Thies, are you on the phone?

MR. THIES (via phone): Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Okay.

For Counsel's information and Mr. Creveling's information, the Court had an opportunity to review the motion for stay of Judge Small ruling and motion to set aside Judge Small ruling, and the Court also reviewed notice of Judge's error that had a letter from Laura

Waters, and a letter from Kathleen Jockey (phonetic),
Yaki? Yaki, I think, attached to it, and I had not seen
cr received a proposed order that the Court directed
Counsel to prepare pursuant to the Court's memorandum
decision. So that's, that's what I've reviewed. Is
there anything else I was supposed to review today?

MR. THIES: Not by me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

And, so, we're on for Mr. Creveling's, I think it'd be fair to characterize it as a motion for reconsideration.

MR. THIES: Right.

THE COURT: Mr. Creveling?

MR. CREVELING: Yes.

First, as Mr. Thies has said, he didn't present anything to the Court against this motion that I have, and I believe under the Court Rules where no written response is put in, then the opposing party doesn't get to make any oral argument. I believe that's in the Court Rules.

THE COURT: It might be in the Okanogan County Local Rules. I don't know. It's not in my Local Rules in Chelan County.

MR. CREVELING: I, I believe it's in the State Rules, that you have to put in a, in a written, written response before you can make oral argument.

THE COURT: I'm not aware of that, but go ahead.

MR. CREVELING: I, I can look it up.

Anyhow, I presented my, my motion, and I believe you have erred. If you review my cross complaint, the legal description for the properties at Methow and French Creek are listed in that cross complaint, and that's all Township 23, Range 32, and Township 23, Range 31, I believe, and Sections 7, 8, 9, 17, 18 and 4 and 5, and then in the other Township where it said 31 and 32 Sections, and those, those legal descriptions are in both, both Court cases, in, in — that's with this Court case, 04-2-00014——

THE COURT: Which, which page is the legal in the Holmes' matter on in the --

MR. CREVELING: Well, in the Holmes' matter where Jennifer sued my uncle, they never put a legal in. They only referred to the real estate contract.

THE COURT: Well, the real estate contract has the legal in it.

MR. CREVELING: Yes, exactly.

THE COURT: And, and where is that legal in this new document?

MR. CREVELING: In, in which?

THE COURT: Well, you filed a motion for stay, and attached to it is an answer and complaint, and attached to that is what's called a lien --

MR. CREVELING: Right.

THE COURT: -- and I'm assuming that the legal's somewhere in there.

MR. CREVELING: Yes. Yes. My --

THE COURT: What page?

MR. CREVELING: -- my prayer, my prayer for -- my cause of action, my prayer for relief on cross complaint tied into the legal description that is in the lien and -

THE COURT: Right. And what, what page of the lien is the legal that's in the Holmes' contract?

MR. CREVELING: The first page.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I --

MR. CREVELING: It's the exact same legal descripttion as in the Holmes' suit against my Uncle Dewade.

THE COURT: Okay. Got it.

Okay. The, the question I had, Mr. Creveling, is the complaint that was brought by Ms. Holmes appears to be for two things; one's quiet title, and the other is to take care of her obligations under the contract, and the motion that Mr. Thies brought appeared to ask for both of those things. I'm not sure how another action involving the same piece of property would have any effect on Ms. Holmes taking care of her obligation under that contract. It may affect this Court's ability to quiet title in this case, given there's apparently related proceedings, but how does that affect her ability to ask the Court to find out how much she owes?

MR. CREVELING: She, she was awarded -- In, in Pierce County she was awarded the purchaser's interest, and in, in the three zero suit (sic), I, I am complaining and requesting relief for that purchaser's interest to be returned to me. So if I prevail on that suit, she would have no interest in the property whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CREVELING: So it does affect --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Thies?

MR. THIES: Your Honor, the Pierce County dissolution order awarding property was never appealed and resjudicata here, I mean... I, I don't think that his including the same legal description as the 03 case can act as a defense to the case that we have before the Court, the 04 case.

THE COURT: Well, he's indicating that he's seeking relief from his obligations in the contract in the 03 case. So I assume Ms. Holmes is a party to that case?

MR. CREVELING: Yes, she is a party to that case.

MR. THIES: She was originally made a party by the

Plaintiff Gebbers, who are seeking to enforce their purchaser's interest, and she didn't have any, any objection to that.

THE COURT: And I'm... The way I understand, Mr. David Creveling is claiming he made a claim against her in that suit unrelated to the Gebbers' claim.

MR. CREVELING: That is 100% correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I -- What, what's confusing to me is the Court, in one respect, thinks, "Well, I have to decide the case that's in front of me today," that's the 04 case, and how that impacts other cases is the parties' problem. In another respect, the Court's concerned that it makes a decision that may run counter to what other decision might be made in the 03 case. So that, that's my predicament.

MR. THIES: And I don't know what the status of the 03 case is.

THE COURT: And you're not representing Ms. Holmes in that?

MR. CREVELING: Randy Thies put in a notice of

appearance, and he's never put in a notice of withdrawal, so he is still on the table in that one.

THE COURT: Do you know what the status of that case is?

MR. CREVELING: It's still active.

THE COURT: So is there a trial date set or anything?

MR. CREVELING: No trial date set yet. It's still in discovery.

MR. THIES: It's what, still in discovery, is that what you said?

MR. CREVELING: That's correct.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Thies, I guess I'm back to where I started the hearing. The Court, although I don't believe my memorandum decision asked you to do so, let me double check. Yeah, I didn't, I didn't think the Court went so far as to make a determination that it was going to quiet title in the order based on your earlier motion to set the payment amount, so the Court wants to make it clear today that that order and judgment should not

include any language that quiets title at this time until we get resolved what impact the 03 cause number may have on this Court's ability to do that.

And, so, but the Court believes that with regard to the case before it, the 04-2-14-1 case, that Ms. Holmes is still entitled to an order that sets the payment amount, we have the interest rate, obviously it's going to be a little bit larger amount now because it's beyond August  $16^{th}$  --

MR. THIES: Well, the payment was made, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. THIES: The payment was made.

THE COURT: Well, I don't, I don't have the order yet, and I, I don't know if a warranty fulfillment deed has been prepared or any of that stuff, so I, I think we ought to have payment made as of the date of the order. The point — The Court picked August 16<sup>th</sup>, hoping that the order would be presented on or before that date, and there's still no order from this Court, so I think additional interest is due —

MR. THIES: Oh --

THE COURT: -- until --

MR. THIES: Okay.

THE COURT: -- until the date of the order.

So you'll need to note for presentment that order, but do not include any judgment quieting title at this time, so, to that extent, Mr. Creveling's motion for reconsideration is granted, although I don't believe I intended to quiet title with the Court's memorandum decision. The only issues I addressed was whether or not Ms. Holmes is entitled to know what she owes, and the Court finds that she is. And the second one was is she entitled to a warranty fulfillment deed if she pays it, and certainly she is, so those, those decisions stand. But not judgment quieting title without figuring out what impact the 03 cause number has on this. And for the record, the 03 cause number the Court's referring to is 03-2-182-3. Okay?

MR. CREVELING: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. THIES: Thank you.

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	THE	COURT: Pardon me?
	MR.	CREVELING: Thank you, Your Honor.
	THE	COURT: Thank you.
	MR.	CREVELING: And God bless.
	THE	COURT: And we'll be in recess 'til, I think
8:00	w	ell, any minute, any second.
		(END OF HEARING - 8:47:04 a.m.)

#### CERTIFICATE

STATE 0	OF	WASHINGTON	)	
			)	ss
County	of	Douglas	)	

I, Jo L. Jackson, do hereby certify:

That I was requested to provide the foregoing transcript of digitally-recorded proceedings;

That the foregoing transcript consisting of twelve (12) pages is a true and correct transcript of all such recorded testimony adduced and proceedings had and of the whole thereof to the best of my ability;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal this  $14^{\rm th}$  day of September 2012.

JO L. JACKSON

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            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                         IN AND FOR OKANOGAN COUNTY
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   HOLMES, et. al.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
                                             No. 04-2-00014-1
11
         vs.
12
   CREVELING, et. al.,
                     Defendants.
13
                          THE HONORABLE T. W. SMALL
January 9, 2006
(Pages 1 - 13)
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   APPEARANCES:
17
   FOR THE PLAINTIFF GEBBERS:
                                            RANDY THIES
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   FOR THE DEFENDANT CREVELING:
                                      Pro Se
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#### Monday, January 9, 2006 at 4:05 p.m.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated.

Mr. Thies, are you there?

MR. THIES (via phone): I am, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Prior to this afternoon's hearing, the Court had an opportunity to review the transcript of the proceedings that we're trying to memorialize by this order that was provided to the Court, I believe, by Mr. Creveling, and the Court just now received the proposed order setting payoff amount and ordering acceptance of final payment and execution of fulfillment deed. So, Mr. Creveling, the question is: Is there anything in this order, the form of this order that you object to? That, that says something different than what I ordered?

MR. CREVELING: I, I just received it at 4:05, 4:06, and I really haven't had time to read it.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. CREVELING: Your Honor, in the very last line of this proposed order it says, "completely satisfying the remaining seller's interest in the subject real property

covered by the real estate contract referenced above."

There has to be some clarification in, in this order that this other case that involves the same legal description where if I prevail in that case, the property purchaser's interest would be returned to me has to be addressed so that, that anybody that's taking an interest in this property behind Jennifer Holmes is aware that if I prevail, there being a lis pendens and the liens filed on this, that they take it subject to that interest, and that property could, in its entirety, revert back into my name, and those people would be having to go against the people that sold the property to them to recover money and not me.

THE COURT: Mr. Thies, the Court reviewed the Clerk's minutes, and it looked like the Court's intent was not to do a, a quiet title summary judgment. Do you have any objection to putting a period after the word deed in line 10?

MR. CREVELING: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Hang on, I asked Mr. Thies a question.

MR. THIES: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm, I'm looking at it right now. No, I can reprint it out and send it up in that fashion.

THE COURT: I, I could line it out.

MR. THIES: Okay.

THE COURT: Just put a period after deed.

Any other objections?

MR. CREVELING: Your Honor, I, I'm in several cases involving right-of-way easements on, on, on the property, and it wasn't clearly written for everybody to be to read it, and, you know, for the people involved, they can understand it, but for the, for the people that have come behind and purchased from other people and purchased from other people, they can't understand how it's written, and I can see that this is going to be nothing but continuous litigation. If I prevail in this other case, people are going to think that they purchased a piece of property, they've paid the money, they should be able to get a deed and have their property and, and hold it free and clear, and it needs to be emphatically stated that, that they're

taking it subject to, so that they don't misconstrue this order --

THE COURT: Well, this Court isn't ruling that that's a valid lawsuit and it's not ruling it's an invalid lawsuit. I'm simply enforcing the terms of the real estate contract that's before this Court in this action. What impact it has on your rights and liabilities vis-a-vis other persons is something for another day. Today is simply there's a contract, all the terms have been complied with assuming the 49 97 (sic) is deposited with the Court Clerk on or before this Friday, and then people get whatever they get.

MR. CREVELING: I agree people get whatever they get, and, you know, people have sold the Brooklyn Bridge and they've gotten nothing, and this is kind of the Brooklyn Bridge deal. If I prevail, they get nothing, and it needs to be well noted that this doesn't make a quiet title for them on this.

THE COURT: Well, we're, we're going to delete the language after the word deed on line 10, put a period

there, and, Ms. Bradley, I've added Clerk's action required bracketed underneath the caption, because looking at this, if a warranty fulfillment deed isn't executed by Mr. David Creveling by four o'clock, then you need to execute the warranty fulfillment deed by this order.

CLERK: Okay.

THE COURT: So I added that language to the caption,  $\mathbf{Mr}$ . Thies.

MR. THIES: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I also want to point to Madame Clerk that if the 900 bucks is not fully in her hands to disburse to Mr. David Creveling, whether he accepts it or not, she doesn't have to execute the deed.

MR. THIES: Right. I'll get that money in there probably tomorrow.

THE COURT: Is today the 9<sup>th</sup>?

CLERK: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

MR. THIES: Yep.

THE COURT: Okay.

Okay. With that deletion on page 2, the Court

signed the order.

MR. THIES: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a good day.

MR. CREVELING: And, and I wish to reserve my rights on, on appeal on, on not having this until just as I come in the door. I --

THE COURT: Yeah, I, I've signed the order --

MR. CREVELING: Right.

THE COURT: -- so now I think it is subject to the 30-day appeal period.

MR. CREVELING: Okay. Very good.

THE COURT: And did you file the transcript?

MR. CREVELING: It's attached to --

THE COURT: I have a bench copy, and I just want to make sure it got in the Court file because that was very helpful. I'll just leave everything in here and let the Clerk --

MR. CREVELING: Yes, but --

THE COURT: -- sort out what's just bench copy and what ought to be filed. Okay.

MR. THIES: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, folks.

CLERK: Please rise.

(END OF HEARING - 4:13:14 a.m.)

Jo L. Jackson, Transcriptionist P. O. Box 914 Waterville, WA 98858 509-754-9507/509-630-1705

#### CERTIFICATE

STATE (	OF	WASHINGTON	)	
			)	ss
County	of	Douglas	)	

I, Jo L. Jackson, do hereby certify:

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JO W. JACKSON

3 4 5 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 8 IN AND FOR OKANOGAN COUNTY 9 GEBBERS, et. al., Plaintiffs, No. 03-2-00182-3 10 VS. 11 ALMA, et. al., 12 Defendants. 13 THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER CULP 14 June 6, 2012 (Pages 1 - 32) 15 APPEARANCES: 16 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: None Identified 17 18 FOR THE DEFENDANT CREVELING: Pro Se 19 ALSO PRESENT: HENRY HAMILTON Fidelity National Title 20 Group 1200 - 6<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 620 21 Seattle, WA 98101-3125 22 RYAN GUNN 23 Attorney at Law 24 P. O. Box 532 Omak, WA 98841-0532 25

Jo L. Jackson, Transcriptionist
P. O. Box 914

Waterville, WA 98858 509-754-9507/509-630-1705

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ORIGINAL

#### Wednesday, June 6, 2012 at 4:00 p.m.

THE COURT: (late start in recording) everyone. Please be seated.

Again, good afternoon and welcome. I'm Judge Culp. Let's see, I recognize Mr. Gunn. I recognize Mr. Creveling. You must be Mr. Hamilton.

MR. HAMILTON: I am indeed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon and welcome.

Let me put on the record this afternoon we're dealing with... The case is actually Gebbers v. Donna Alma, Fred Alma, David Creveling and others as Defendants, and then David Creveling, as a third-party Plaintiff, versus Donna Alma, Fred Alma, Jennifer Creveling and so forth, 03-2-182-3 is the case number, and we're actually here this afternoon, then, Mr. Hamilton, on your motion first to shorten time, and, and then to intervene on behalf of, I suppose they're -- they'd be characterized as really sort of third-party property owners who, as I understand it, bought property from the

former Mrs. Creveling --

MR. HAMILTON: Actually, it's a little more convoluted than that, Your Honor, (inaudible - away from mic) Mrs. Creveling sold it to --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: -- a company called Caribou (phonetic) --

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. HAMILTON: -- who then sold it to some of the third-parties, some of the third parties have also purchased it from fourth parties, etcetera, on resale from Caribou.

THE COURT: Okay. Alright.

MR. HAMILTON: So it's a little more attenuated, but, but, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, indeed, these are people who probably don't have any idea who Mr. Creveling is, because he was out of the picture by virtue of the divorce or dissolution from some years ago.

Then, Mr. Creveling, this afternoon you filed

as Holmes, that's her last name after the divorce. And then, you also asked me to do a number of things in a separate case from 2004, and that, that case is not before the Court this afternoon. I'll only be dealing with issues involved in this 03 case.

You have your own motion for shortening time, and so I'm guessing, gentlemen, it's probably agreed that we would go ahead this afternoon on short notice.

Mr. Hamilton, anything you want to say in support of

and your motion also (sic) to shorten time, and you

filed basically your request to deny the intervenors'

motion, and, in essence, reaffirm the, the default taken

against the former Ms. Creveling, now known apparently

MR. HAMILTON: No. I mean, Mr. Creveling is here. He's obviously filed a pleading. I received that when I walked in earlier, so I think it would be stipulated by the parties to be forward (sic) on shortened time.

THE COURT: Okay.

your motion to shorten time?

Mr. Creveling, I assume you want to go ahead today, too, on short notice, as you've requested, isn't

that correct?

MR. CREVELING: On, on my pleadings, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CREVELING: Mr. Hamilton never put in a notice of appearance representing his clients, so I don't feel that his motions can be brought today.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that you care about that so much as long as you've got the matter that's before the Court, isn't that right?

MR. CREVELING: Yes.

THE COURT: And he's here now.

MR. CREVELING: Yes.

THE COURT: So, tell me how that makes any difference.

MR. CREVELING: You would only hear my motions if, if his wasn't properly before the Court.

THE COURT: Oh. Well, but it -- It's properly before the Court in the sense that it's filed and you have notice of it. The question is: Do you have adequate notice? And that's why there's this question about shortening the time, just as you're requesting

that the Court shorten the time in order to allow you to file and have your matter heard also.

MR. CREVELING: Yes.

THE COURT: So, if I'm going to hear yours, it requires that I hear his first or as part of it because yours is asking me to reaffirm.

MR. CREVELING: Okay.

THE COURT: It seems to me it's, it's really not a big deal, and since you are here, you did have notice, and, in fact, you've had time in which to respond to it, which you did. So the Court grants the motion to shorten time on behalf of both parties, and with that, I think my only question — This is, this is a little unusual, Mr. Hamilton, in the sense that it's a motion to intervene by people who are not parties to the case yet. They're wanting to become parties for purposes of setting aside the default. So my question to you is this: What notice, if any, would the other parties be entitled to of your motion today?

MR. HAMILTON: Other parties being Gebbers, Alma, etcetera?

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THE COURT: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: We served Plaintiffs' Counsel, and he withdrew. He, he announced that he didn't want any part of this and he considered the matter done. So, from that standpoint, notice was provided to Plaintiff as to it's -- as to their involvement. I'm not aware of any other Counsel that was involved in that.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

And, Mr. Gunn, what do you view as your role today?

MR. GUNN: Your Honor, I represent one of the landowners, Methow River Ranch, and so they asked me to be present for this motion.

THE COURT: And are they a subsequent purchaser, then?

MR. GUNN: They are for Caribou, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Alright. So I assume you're in favor of Mr. Hamilton's motion?

MR. GUNN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GUNN: I have no objections now.

THE COURT: Alright.

Okay. Mr. Hamilton, I've read your motion and I would invite you to add to it anything as you wish.

MR. HAMILTON: Which motion, Your Honor? The motion to intervene?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. No, I think, I think the motion stands. I just want to emphasize that Mr.

Creveling is, is attempting to collect rent and do other things. I think that it's necessary for the owners of the real property to be involved in this so that they could set aside the default judgment. They need a venue, obviously, to get the default judgment (sic) so they could have standing. I think they've established standing by virtue of being the owners of the real property. So, I, I request that the Court grant our motion -- limited motion to intervene. We don't care about the underlying substance so much as, as removing the cloud on title.

THE COURT: And, and in terms of -- You're wanting to intervene, but then you're also, I think today,

aren't you, wanting the Court to consider setting aside the default?

MR. HAMILTON: Absolutely. Absolutely. Because, again, it acts as a cloud to title. As to the substantive matters between Gebbers, Alma, Mr. Creveling, etcetera, we really don't care, as a general rule. The only reason that my clients care is limited to the fact that Mr. Creveling was able to obtain a default judgment against his former spouse, which judgment asserts a transfer of real property back to him, which acts diametrically opposite to the previous Court order, Court orders in the matter, as well as the warranty deed.

THE COURT: Have you talked with an attorney, Robert Dodge, by chance about all of this?

MR. HAMILTON: I have not. Mr. Dodge withdrew almost immediately after this matter came up, and, in fact, his letter was attached to, I think, one or --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. HAMILTON: -- two of the declarations --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HAMILTON: -- basically saying, "My work is

done. I have no further involvement."

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Gunn, anything to add --

MR. GUNN: No, Your Honor, no.

THE COURT: Alright.

MR. GUNN: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Creveling, comments in response to the motion?

MR. CREVELING: Yes, I, I don't believe that they have cause to bring this against me. The default judgment is good, and their cause of action will be against their title insurance companies, not me. They weren't a party to this. They took the property subject to this lawsuit. The *lis pendens* was properly filed in the Court and in the Auditor's Office, and the liens were properly filed in the Court and in the Auditor's Office.

THE COURT: When was the lis pendens filed?

MR. CREVELING: Um... Like June 2003. It was eight -- It's five to eight days before Jennifer sold the property is when the *lis pendens* was filed.

Lis pendens was filed in the Okanogan County

Auditor's Office and in the Court case on June  $6^{th}$  2003, and Jennifer sold the property, her signature is, is notarized as June  $15^{th}$ , but the notary signed his signature the  $18^{th}$  of June. It was either five or eight days later.

THE COURT: What was the basis -- I, I know that there was lengthy litigation over that, and I know there had been a number of Judges and a number of orders signed and so forth.

MR. CREVELING: Judge Allan ruled that my claims were, were, were still in effect. The order that, that Mr. Hamilton is referring to that he thinks cancels this out was in that other case, in the 04-2-0014-1 (sic) case, and that was before Judge Small. That was the case of Jennifer Creveling Holmes versus Dewade Creveling, my uncle, and Carolrae Caughey, my cousin, for the payoff on the seller's assignment, the seller's interest in the property, and my uncle transferred the seller's interest in the property to me, so I became intervenor since I own that interest in the contract, and the Judge set the payoff amount, with additional

interest.

THE COURT: When was that?

MR. CREVELING: That order was signed by Judge Small on January 9<sup>th</sup> 2006, and it was quite clear, we argued it pretty hard that date, and it was quite clear that, that Judge Small did not award anything more than just the payoff on the seller's interest in the contract.

THE COURT: And was that in the 04 case?

MR. CREVELING: Correct. So that left all of my other claims in my other case unaffected by the 04 case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CREVELING: And Randy Thies presented an order trying to say that it, that it wiped out my claims in, in the 03 case, and Judge -- Yes?

THE COURT: 03 or 04?

MR. CREVELING: Trying to wipe out the claims in my 03 case where I counterclaimed.

THE COURT: In this case, 182-3 from 2003 or a different one?

MR. CREVELING: No, in 04-2-0014-1 (sic), Randy

Thies presented an order trying, trying to do away with the 03 case, my, my claims in the 03 case, and, and that's my Exhibit number E, and Judge Small was kind of harsh with him for trying that and he crossed out the last line of the order he presented and signed the order that's my Exhibit F. He removed Randy Theis's language so that it only affected the 04 case.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's 04-2-014-1 (sic).

I, I guess what I'm trying to do is, in the big picture, see the correlation between the 04 case and the 03 case, and, frankly, I'm not familiar enough with the file, files to know what that is. What, what bothers me...

MR. CREVELING: The 04 case was only on the payoff on the seller's interest in the property. Had nothing to do with any claims in the 03 case.

THE COURT: When did you and Ms. Holmes get divorced?

MR. CREVELING: She started divorce proceedings against me in '97, and it took five years.

THE COURT: So you got divorced in 02?

MR. CREVELING: That's correct, I believe.

THE COURT: And, apparently, there was some -- as part of the divorce, either settlement or, or Court decision, she received a deed to some property?

MR. CREVELING: Subject to her paying me a percentage of the sale, which she has never paid me anything.

THE COURT: So bring me up to date, then. How did you... Is that the nature of the litigation in the 04 case?

MR. CREVELING: That's part of the litigation, because that is filed in there as one -- as part of it under that, that, that '98 case, and the other part of it is the having bore false witness part (sic).

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CREVELING: And that was what she did to gain the property.

To gain the property, she testified that she put a bunch of money into the property, and she didn't. She had no money when I married her. She was in debt.

THE COURT: Okay. So she was the plaintiff in that action against you, and Mr. Thies was representing her

at the time of the hearing, and Judge Small ultimately signed the order. That's when he crossed the out the last sentence that you mentioned, and that was in January of 06?

MR. CREVELING: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And, so, then there's reference, Mr. Hamilton, if I could just come back to you for a second, in your motion and part of the supporting material on page 6, the last paragraph at line 19, if you could find that. That paragraph begins... I'll let you just find it here. Got it, page 6, at line 19, the last paragraph begins, "The effect of the 2006 warranty deed?"

MR. HAMILTON: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. "Conveyed the entire estate held by Mr. Creveling in the property at that time and any after-acquired title." What, what is that referring to?

MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, that -- It's interesting we're all back on the same Court order, which is Judge Small ordered Mr. Creveling to sign over this warranty fulfillment deed, and that is that deed Mr.

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Creveling refused to do or failed to do, and so the Court, pursuant to this order, entered a statutory warranty fulfillment deed, fully transferring whatever claim to title there was to Jennifer Creveling to make it abundantly clear that she had accomplished whatever she needed to do, and that she's entitled to the full property. A fair reading of the order indicates that once she pays the money into the Court's registry, that -- or Mr. Creveling is to sign the statutory warranty deed, if he fails to do that, the Clerk was directed to do that. Exhibit number 2 in my declaration is a copy of that statutory warranty deed.

THE COURT: Okay. So it is one and the same, then, between the two lawsuits?

MR. HAMILTON: Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. CREVELING: In other words, the, the 04 action has a bearing on the title in the 03 case because it's this same property, isn't it, that ultimately --

MR. HAMILTON: It's all the same real property.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: It's been litigated and litigated --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: -- and, and ultimately the property was transferred to Jennifer Holmes, title was given to her, and a statutory warranty deed was provided to her.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: Such that she was free, then, to sell the property to Caribou.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's, that's just what I wanted to make sure of is that I wasn't missing something in the fact that we are talking about the same piece of property between the two cause numbers. Okay.

Alright. So thank you. I'll come back to you for any final comments, Mr. Hamilton, in just a moment, but, Mr. Creveling, anything else you want to say for purposes of this afternoon?

MR. CREVELING: No, I just want to restate that, that her complaint was only for the -- in the 04 case was only for payoff on the seller's interest in the property, and my complaint in the 03 case was for the return of the buyer's interest, which was the only interest she held at the time.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, alright, thank you.

And, Mr. Hamilton, any response?

MR. HAMILTON: I'm not sure exactly where we are,
Your Honor, but we're talking about the same parcel of
property that title is fully vested in Jennifer
Creveling, pursuant to the Court order and statutory
warranty deed. Mrs. Creveling, or the former Mrs.
Creveling, according to the Court order, has done everything she's supposed to do, and was entitled to the
warranty deed, which the Court then entered. All of
which underscores the need for my client to be able to
address the underlying default judgment, in which the
Court's transferred title to her former property back to
Mr. Creveling.

THE COURT: Mr. Bozarth (phonetic), you're here as a spectator, I assume?

MR. BOZARTH: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The County doesn't have any interest in this?

MR. BOZARTH: No.

THE COURT: Alright.

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MR. BOZARTH: Just the (inaudible - away from mic)

THE COURT: Mr. Creveling, what -- It's none of my
business, but apparently Mr. Dodge does not represent

MR. CREVELING: Correct.

you anymore, is that right?

THE COURT: And he is the one who presented the default -- the order of default to the Court on your behalf, Judge Burchard signed that. He's also the one who presented ex parte to me the actual judgment, and which I reviewed the file and didn't find a notice of appearance, I didn't find any answer, and, and so I signed it. The difficulty is that, I think both Judge Burchard and for myself anyway (sic), and I suspect perhaps even Mr. Dodge, but I'm not sure about that, had no way of knowing the ramifications of what this default would do in terms of your position and, and, and the effect on, on what appear to be bona fide subsequent purchasers of the property. And when I say bona fide, I don't have any reason to know, I, I don't know what happened in terms of the timing with your lis pendens and when that was filed in terms of any real estate

transactions involving Ms. Holmes. I, I don't know anything about that. I don't have any reason to doubt your dates, and it may be that there's litigation there for another day, I don't know.

But what I do know is that at this point in time it seems as if there are people, there are parties who purchased this property thinking that they were purchasing it in good faith and with clear title, and it's important that we go back now and... Mr. Hamilton, I don't -- I, I understand what you're thinking with vacating the default. I wonder if the Court couldn't fashion some order which enjoined or prohibited Mr. Creveling from taking action to charge rent or put his cattle on it or otherwise use it, but that may not be sufficient because of any title issues. Is that your -- It's probably your larger concern?

MR. HAMILTON: That is very much their concern, Your Honor. It's the, the latter -- excuse me, the former part as to cattle, rent, is subject to the restraining order, but beyond that, it, it acts as a cloud on title and impacts them in very real ways.

It goes -- The underlying default judgment, I think from a procedural standpoint, needs to be set aside. And that's not to say that Mr. Creveling can't get, at a later date, a default judgment against his wife for the money he claims she owes, etcetera, but the default judgment itself, which attempts or purports to transfer title, I think, is, is not proper from the standpoint of the it's based on a pleading (sic) that didn't set forth sufficient facts in evidence, and, and from that standpoint I think that it was not supported in the record, and I think that the attempt to transport after-acquired title, pursuant to a Court order, is, is improper, but doesn't necessarily get or doesn't get Mr. Creveling anything by (inaudible - away from mic) of the warranty deed essentially kicks it back to Caribou eventually, and then to the, the purchasers. that standpoint, he may be entitled to a default order, he may be entitled to a default judgment seeking whatever damages he, he has against his former spouse, but I don't believe he's in any way, shape or form entitled to obtain title to real property that hasn't been in his

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former spouse's name for nearly a decade.

THE COURT: Okay.

I'm going to sign an order on presentation which does vacate the default judgment.

Mr. Creveling, in my view, your action or your remedy here is against your ex-wife. If you feel that she didn't pay you whatever amount you're entitled to, then the action is against her, it is not, your action is not against people who came along later and who bought this property in a legitimate fashion, and under circumstances that it appears were, were totally proper. In other words, you can't come back some years later and say, "Just because my ex-wife didn't pay me what she was supposed to," if she didn't, you can't now take these people's property from them. That's just not right. And, so, in the interest of justice, it's appropriate to set this aside, and without a default judgment, then you don't have any right to -- as far as I'm concerned, you don't have any right to charge rent. There's no right to run your cattle.

Mr. Hamilton, I don't know that I need to --

I don't think it's appropriate that I necessarily quiet title in them because... Well, I'm simply going to restrain -- If there's a default -- If the default's set aside, then he doesn't have any right.

MR. HAMILTON: I'm not going to quibble with you on that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: I believe, believe that's accurate because if the default judgment is set aside, the cloud is removed, and I think we're, we're fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, again, Mr. Creveling, you certainly can disagree with this, but I, I just hope you understand, as far as I'm concerned, your remedy here is against your ex-wife, Ms. Holmes, it is not against these people, the named parties seeking to intervene.

So, with that, Mr. Hamilton, anything further?

MR. HAMILTON: I have nothing further, Your Honor.

I do have three forms of the order to present to the Court if -- one on the motion to shorten time and motion to intervene and on the motion to vacate, but if

the Court has its own order presented, we'll...

THE COURT: Do you have proposed orders right there?

MR. HAMILTON: I do.

THE COURT: I'll sign them, please, and...

MR. HAMILTON: Here's the motion to shorten time order. Order on motion to intervene.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, if I could just have all three of them.

MR. HAMILTON: Sure.

THE COURT: What I'm doing is adding copy received language in a place for Mr. Creveling to sign them.

Mr. Creveling, by signing there where it says copy received on the back page, you're not, you're not necessarily agreeing with them; you're simply acknowledging receipt of a copy of it. And I am going to, I'm going to delete -- In the caption of the order vacating default judgment, I'm going to delete language, quote, quieting title and granting restraining order, because, again, in my view, and, Mr. Hamilton, if this continues to be an issue, let me know. I, I find Mr. Creveling to

be very good at, at cooperating with Court orders. He may not like them, but once they're signed, in my experience, he does abide by them, so I don't think there's going to be a continuing issue with regard to rent or cattle or anything like that, so I have deleted that language from the caption.

Okay. So I'll ask you to sign those. Mr.

Creveling, you'll sign them, and, again, by signing them you're not necessarily agreeing, and I guess, I guess I got ahead of myself, I'm sorry, you had the last page, it's already there, sorry. That's what happens when I -

MR. CREVELING: They have a restraining order on page 2 also.

THE COURT: Mr. Hamilton, I'll... On page 2 is there language about a restraining order?

MR. HAMILTON: (inaudible - away from mic) Yes --

THE COURT: Okay. That --

MR. HAMILTON: -- actually, the third paragraph does --

THE COURT: We'll just delete that, then.

MR. HAMILTON: -- provide that there.

THE COURT: It's not necessary.

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. (inaudible - away from mic) vacating default judgment, I think consistent with the Court's ruling, we actually should redact that, lines 14 through 22 --

THE COURT: Is that quiet title and restraining order?

MR. HAMILTON: Yes, parts of it, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: But --

THE COURT: The last time I tried to mark this up, though, I...

MR. CREVELING: Lines 8 through... And, Your Honor, we've got cows in Section 16 (inaudible - away from mic) do have to push those cows back in at times.

THE COURT: Well, you know the law in that regard, Mr. Creveling, so --

MR. CREVELING: We have the right to get our cows back in range --

THE COURT: I'm just telling you you know what the

law is.

MR. CREVELING: Right. I don't want an attorney to come back (inaudible - away from mic) in that regard.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's a matter where I suspect law enforcement would be called, and if there's a problem, it would be dealt with, but it's not really an issue for me to have worry about today. I mean, I understand what your concern is. I think you're -- that you'll be responsible in that regard. If something happens, it'll be dealt with.

What I've done is to delete and initial the paragraphs on page 2 regarding quieting title and restraining order, okay?

MR. CREVELING: Okay.

THE COURT: So I've signed that. I'm also going to sign, then, the order to shorten time and the order to allow intervening.

MR. CREVELING: And hen will you providem e with a copy of this?

MR. HAMILTON: As soon as --

CLERK: I will provide a copy to him.

1 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. Okay. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 Mr. Gunn, there's a place here for you to sign 4 these also. 5 MR. GUNN: Alright. 6 7 THE COURT: So, Mr. Creveling, I'm curious, did 8 your wife ever pay you the money? 9 MR. CREVELING: No. 10 THE COURT: Okay. You need to, you need to seek 11 that remedy against her, then. 12 13 MR. CREVELING: She was thrown in prison for beat-14 ing one of her boyfriends up with a lead pipe --15 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 16 MR. CREVELING: -- after she moved another boy-17 friend in with her in the first place (inaudible - away 18 19 from mic) She had a public defender. 20 THE COURT: Is she still there? 21 MR. CREVELING: I don't know. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Well --23 MR. CREVELING: I, I (inaudible - away from mic) 24 25 come home from work, you know (inaudible - away from

mic)

THE COURT: Well, I'll wish you good luck in that regard. You're familiar enough with the legal system, you know, you know what to do.

MR. CREVELING: (inaudible - away from mic) you don't have to work anymore.

THE COURT: Well, that's --

MR. CREVELING: I work hard (inaudible - away from mic)

THE COURT: It was somewhat humorous, your comment, I mean, but my point remains, you know the legal system well enough that you need to pursue that remedy against her.

MR. CREVELING: My judgment, my judgment (inaudible - away from mic)

THE COURT: Oh, you already have one against her?

MR. CREVELING: Against that real property.

THE COURT: No, against her for whatever it was that she was supposed to pay you.

MR. CREVELING: No, it's in that, in that cause number that I gave (inaudible - away from mic) real

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property.

THE COURT: But that was -- would've been super-seded, I'm guess, I don't know this, but I'm guessing by whatever happened in your divorce in 2002.

MR. CREVELING: No (inaudible - away from mic) that's what I'm talking about. That's the '98 case.

THE COURT: Sorry, I'm not following that.

MR. CREVELING: (inaudible - away from mic) a default against real property.

THE COURT: Well, regardless of that, it -- there's just no way, then, that subsequently these people who purchased this property stand to lose it just because of whatever your ex-wife, I keep stressing that, did or didn't do in terms of the Court order that she pay you (sic). Because of that order in 04 that directs that the deed be granted, this is in 06, these people had the right to buy it.

I've signed the orders and we'll get copies. Is that right? Okay.

MR. CREVELING: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Alright.

Okay. Mr. Hamilton, anything else?

MR. HAMILTON: No.

THE COURT: Alright.

MR. HAMILTON: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. We're in recess.

CLERK: All --

(END OF HEARING - 4:35:51 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

STATE OF WASHINGTON )

ss.
County of Douglas )

I, Jo L. Jackson, do hereby certify:

That I was requested to provide the foregoing transcript of digitally-recorded proceedings;

That the foregoing transcript consisting of thirtyone (31) pages is a true and correct transcript of all
such recorded testimony adduced and proceedings had and of
the whole thereof to the best of my ability;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal this  $14^{\rm th}$  day of September 2012.

JOL. JACKSON